Simulation of price and capacity competition in the airlines industry

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Abstract We provide a simple online game that can be played in a business strategy or economics course to illustrate the incentives faced by competitors in an oligopoly industry.

Explanation of capacity constrained demand

Two firms (airlines) first choose capacity Q_i and then set prices p_i with which they compete. The system of demand is linear and symmetric:

$$q_1 = a - bp_1 + cp_2 \tag{1}$$

$$q_2 = a - bp_2 + cp_1 \tag{2}$$

As the firms' supply is constrained by their capacity choice in the first period and cannot be negative, their actual sales are constrained by $0 \le q_i^s \le Q_i$.

When firm j's sales are capacity constrained $(q_j > Q_j)$, the excess demand will be available to firm i. The (implicit) price for firm j's effective supply \tilde{q}_j is

$$p_j = \frac{a}{b} - \frac{1}{b}\tilde{q}_j + \frac{c}{b}p_i, \tag{3}$$

Firm i's effective demand as a function of firm j's (potentially constrained) supply is

$$q_i^D = \frac{b+c}{b}a - \frac{b^2 - c^2}{b}p_1 - \frac{c}{b}\tilde{q}_j \tag{4}$$

where $\tilde{q}_j = \max\{\min\{q_j,Q_j\},0\}$. Notice that $q_i^D > q_i$ whenever firm j's capacity constraint binds.

Finally, firm i's supply may also not exceed its capacity and must be non-negative. Hence firm i's supply (sales) is

$$q_i^s = \max\{\min\{q_i^D, Q_i\}, 0\}.$$

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